The right to legal representation is a fundamental aspect of the American criminal justice system. When facing criminal charges, individuals in Maine have the right to an attorney who defends their interests and protects their rights by providing competent representation. However, not all legal representation is effective, and in some cases, counsel’s action or inaction may be found to be ineffective. In this blog post, we’ll delve into the concept of what Ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) is, and the legal standards Maine uses to determine whether trial, appellate, or plea agreement counsel’s representation was effective.
What is Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (IAC) in Maine?
Ineffective assistance of counsel, commonly known as “IAC,” is a legal term that refers to the inadequate performance of an attorney representing a defendant in a criminal case. It is a violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees the right to a fair trial with effective legal representation. When an attorney’s performance falls below the standards considered reasonable, and this deficiency results in prejudice to the defendant’s case, it can be grounds for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Maine’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (IAC) Standard Regarding Trial and Appellate Attorneys
Maine applies the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984) for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel Hodgdon v. State, 249 A.3d 132 (Me. 2021), and to evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel Fortune v. State, 158 A.3d 512 (Me. 2017). Under this two-prong test, a defendant must establish both a deficient performance by counsel and prejudice from that deficient performance.
Deficient Performance: The first prong of the test requires the defendant to demonstrate that their trial or appellate attorney’s performance was deficient. This means showing that the attorney’s representation fell below the “objective standard of reasonableness” expected of criminal attorneys. Courts typically consider whether the trial attorney made errors that a competent attorney would not have made, such as failing to investigate crucial evidence, providing incorrect legal advice, or not adequately preparing for trial. Courts typically evaluate the strength of the claims raised, or abandoned, in the defendant’s appellate brief when deciding whether or not appellate counsel was ineffective.
Prejudice: The second prong of the test demands the defendant establish that the attorney’s deficient performance resulted in prejudice to their case. Prejudice, in this context, means that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial or a proceeding would have been different had counsel been effective. In other words, the defendant must overcome that the errors of their attorney had a material impact on the trial or the direct appeal’s outcome.
This two-part test sets a high bar for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel, as it requires both a showing of deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Courts are cautious about second-guessing strategic decisions made by defense attorneys and typically give them a degree of deference.
Understanding the Appellate Attorney’s Responsibility
Appellate attorneys are not required to raise every arguable issue or every possible nonfrivolous claim (not even those specifically requested by the defendant), they are expected to explore and select the claims most likely to succeed on appeal. Smith v. Robbins, 120 S.Ct. 746 (2000). Courts consider the relative merit of the omitted issue, in relation to any appealed issues, in order to determine whether appellate counsel’s performance was adequate. In the context of ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims, the court examines whether the appellate attorney’s failure to raise the omitted issue prejudiced the defendant. This requires the defendant show that there could have been a specific issue raised on appeal that would have resulted in the appellate court declaring a reversible error.
Maine’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (IAC) Standard Regarding Plea Agreement Attorneys
Maine applies the ineffective assistance of counsel standard set forth in Hill v. Lockhart, 106 S.Ct. 366 (1985) to evaluate claims of ineffective plea agreement counsel. See: Heon v. State, 931 A.2d 1068 (Me. 2007). Hill adopted the deficient performance and prejudice standard articulated in Strickland v. Washington.
When a defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel arises from alleged errors committed by counsel in the guilty plea process, the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis is satisfied by the defendant establishing that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he or she would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.
My Final Thoughts
When defendants allege an ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel claim in Maine, the deficiency and prejudice requirement articulated in Strickland v. Washington is the standard used to analyze the claim. When alleging a claim of ineffective assistance of plea agreement counsel, the deficiency and prejudice standard articulated in Hill v. Lockhart is applied. The prejudice requirement in Hill is met when the defendant can establish that, but for counsel’s errors, he or she would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.
If you, or someone you know, will be pursuing any type of ineffective assistance of counsel claim in Maine, our book, The Colossal Book of Criminal Citations, is a crucial resource in the pursuit of justice. Order your copy today, or on behalf of someone incarcerated.