The right to legal representation is a fundamental aspect of the American criminal justice system. When facing criminal charges, individuals in New York have the right to an attorney who defends their interests and protects their rights by providing competent representation. However, not all legal representation is effective, and in some cases, counsel’s action or inaction may be found to be ineffective. In this blog post, we’ll delve into the concept of what Ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) is, and the legal standards New York uses to determine whether trial, appellate, or plea agreement counsel’s representation was effective.
What is Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (IAC) in New York?
Ineffective assistance of counsel, commonly known as “IAC,” is a legal term that refers to the inadequate performance of an attorney representing a defendant in a criminal case. It is a violation of the defendant’s right to counsel, which guarantees the right to a fair trial with effective legal representation. When an attorney’s performance falls below the standards considered reasonable, and this deficiency results in prejudice to the defendant’s case, it can be grounds for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
New York’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (IAC) Standard Regarding Trial Attorneys
New York’s constitutional requirement of effective assistance of counsel is met when the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of a particular case, viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation, reveal that the attorney provided meaningful representation. People v. Benevento, 91 NY2d 708 (N.Y. 1998).
Under Strickland v Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), the federal standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must satisfy a two-pronged test in order to establish that counsel was ineffective: 1) that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and, 2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Under the New York standard, the first prong is identical to its federal counterpart, but the second prong is based on the fairness of the process as a whole rather than the impact of counsel’s errors on the outcome of the case. The difference between the federal and state standards is that “[o]ur state standard… offers greater protection than the federal test” because, “under our State Constitution, even in the absence of a reasonable probability of a different outcome, inadequacy of counsel will still warrant reversal whenever a defendant is deprived of a fair trial” People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143 (N.Y. 2005).
New York’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (IAC) Standard Regarding Appellate Attorneys
New York’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel standard is identified in People v Stultz, 2 NY3d 277 (N.Y. 2004), wherein the court extended the “meaningful representation” standard defined in Benevento to appellate counsel. In the appellate context, the court held that appellate advocacy is meaningful if it reflects a competent grasp of the facts, the law and appellate procedure, supported by appropriate authority and argument. Effective appellate representation “by no means requires counsel to brief or argue every issue that may have merit rather, appellate attorneys are afforded wide latitude in deciding which points to advance”
Understanding the Appellate Attorney’s Responsibility
Appellate attorneys are not required to raise every arguable issue or every possible nonfrivolous claim (not even those specifically requested by the defendant), they are expected to explore and select the claims most likely to succeed on appeal. Smith v. Robbins, 120 S.Ct. 746 (2000). Courts consider the relative merit of the omitted issue, in relation to any appealed issues, in order to determine whether appellate counsel’s performance was adequate. In the context of ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims, the court examines whether the appellate attorney’s failure to raise the omitted issue prejudiced the defendant. This requires the defendant show that there could have been a specific issue raised on appeal that would have resulted in the appellate court declaring a reversible error.
New York’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (IAC) Standard Regarding Plea Agreement Attorneys
New York’s ineffective assistance of plea agreement counsel standard is detailed in People v Hernandez, 22 NY3d 972 (N.Y. 2013). In a plea context, where the voluntariness of the guilty plea is not in dispute, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, they would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial, or that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.
My Final Thoughts
When defendants raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim in New York, the deficiency and prejudice requirement articulated in Caban is the standard used to analyze the claim. If an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is raised, the deficiency and prejudice requirement articulated in Stultz is the standard used to analyze the claim. When defendants raise a a claim of ineffective assistance of plea agreement counsel, the deficiency and prejudice requirement articulated in Hernandez is the standard used to analyze the claim. Regardless of the proceeding wherein ineffectiveness is alleged to have occurred, both deficient performance and prejudice must be established by the defendant.
If you, or someone you know, will be pursuing any type of ineffective assistance of counsel claim in New York, our book, The Colossal Book of Criminal Citations, is a crucial resource in the pursuit of justice. Order your copy today, or on behalf of someone incarcerated.